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Abstract 
 
We exploit variation in cultural heritage across CEOs who are children and grandchildren of immigrants 
to demonstrate that the cultural origins of CEOs matter for corporate outcomes. Following shocks to 
industry competition, firms led by CEOs who are second- or third-generation immigrants are associated 
with a 6.2% higher profitability than the average firm. This effect weakens over successive immigrant 
generations, is not detected for top executives other than the CEO, and can be explained by specific 
cultural values that prevail in the CEO’s country of origin. Our paper offers novel insights on the 
interactions between informal institutions and corporate outcomes. 
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There is a growing literature demonstrating that the individual ‘styles’ of CEOs matter 
for corporate policies. While recent research provides insights into the heterogeneity in 
managerial styles with reference to a CEO’s physiology (Adams, Keloharju and Knüpfer, 2016) 
and life experiences (Bernile, Bhagwat and Rau, 2016; Crongvist and Yu, 2016; Dittmar and 
Duchin, 2016; Schoar and Zuo, 2016), there is limited attention on the role of culture in shaping 
CEO behavior and its resulting effects on corporate outcomes.  This is partly due to the 
challenges in measuring ‘culture’. The impact of culture (irrespective of how defined) on 
economic outcomes is easily confounded with economic and other institutional factors that, 
much like culture, can vary across countries.  
The empirical setting in this paper is designed to address this challenge. We hand-collect 
a novel dataset that tracks the family trees of US CEOs and focus on CEOs who are the children 
or grandchildren of immigrants (Gen2-3 CEOs, henceforth). While Gen2-3 CEOs are exposed to 
the same legal, social and institutional influences as other US-born CEOs, they possess a cultural 
heritage that is different from those of other CEOs. Specifically, the cultural preferences and 
beliefs of Gen2-3 CEOs are likely to bear the cultural mark of the countries that their parents or 
grandparents have emigrated from. In this paper, we test whether the cultural values prevailing in 
the country that a Gen2-3 CEO’s ancestors originate from shape firm policy choices and 
performance in a changing industry environment. 
To study the impact of culture on economic outcomes, it is central to understand how a 
person’s cultural values are formed and transmitted. Some studies posit that cultural attitudes 
adapt quickly to changes in economic incentives and opportunities. For instance, Gruber and 
Hungerman (2008) show that when the opportunity costs of religious participation increase, 
church attendance and donations drop sharply. Others argue that cultural values are deeply 
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rooted and change slowly over time (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963). For instance, several studies 
document that the descendants of immigrants show a degree of cultural distinctiveness over 
several subsequent generations (e.g., Fernandez and Fogli, 2009; Giavazzi, Petkov and 
Schiantarelli, 2015; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). In line with the latter view, our paper 
documents distinct behavior among Gen2-3 CEOs and offers an explanation based on cultural 
heritage. 
To identify a CEO’s cultural heritage, we hand-collect data on the country of origin of a 
CEO’s ancestors from ancestry.com – the world’s largest genealogy database with access to 
almost 17 billion family histories. Our main approach, as described in detail in Section 1.1, maps 
out a CEO’s family tree. Specifically, we search for a CEO’s family records to identify 
information about their parents which we then use to identify their ancestors. We search census 
records as well as birth and marriage certificates and other publicly available information to 
accurately track a CEO’s ancestral history as well as whether s/he is a Gen2-3 CEO.1 This fine-
grained dataset enables us to construct precise tests of the role of CEO cultural heritage on firm 
outcomes.  
To identify the effect of CEO’s cultural heritage on firm outcomes, we employ a 
methodology similar in spirit to Opler and Titman (1994) and Yonker (2016). Our research 
design exploits competitive shocks at industry-level that are unanticipated by both the CEO and 
the firm. This allows us to circumvent ambiguity over whether CEOs imprint their preferences 
on a firm or whether CEOs and firms match on unobserved factors. The basic idea is that an 
industry shock forces the CEO to make decisions to navigate the firm through a changing 
                                                            
1We use a strict procedure to ensure that our ancestry data are reliable. For instance, we require that a CEO needs to 
have both paternal and maternal ancestors originate from the same country and migrate to the US the same number 
of generations ago. Encouragingly, this is the case for the majority of CEOs in our data, with 85% of CEOs have 
ancestors marrying individuals of similar ancestral heritage. To account for any self-selection arising from retaining 
CEOs with clearly identifiable ancestral information, we base our regressions on a Heckman two-step procedure.  
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industry environment. The ensuing decisions are likely to be complex, non-routine and 
unstructured and CEO characteristics therefore likely to be salient in how CEOs respond. If the 
cultural heritage of a CEO maters to corporate outcomes, we should observe systematic post-
shock differences across firms led by CEOs with different ancestry. 
As a source of competitive shocks, we use the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 which legalizes interstate branching across the US and 
markedly increases competitive pressures in some US states (see Cornaggia et al., 2015; Rice 
and Strahan, 2010). Our identification relies on the staggered (and unanticipated) deregulation of 
interstate branching applicable to banks in individual US states. IBBEA therefore introduces 
substantial variation in industry competition along both geographical and temporal dimensions. 
Given this setting, our empirical analyses focus on the banking industry. However, the 
implications of our findings are also applicable to non-banks.    
Our analysis of how a CEO’s cultural heritage shapes firm policy choices and 
performance under competitive pressure is built on three blocks. First, we document a detectable 
performance effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs, implying that these CEOs behave differently from 
the population of CEOs. Specifically, when competition intensifies, banks led by Gen2-3 CEOs 
exhibit a 6.2% increase in return on assets compared with banks led by Gen4+ CEOs. 
Intriguingly, when examining the different generations of immigrants that a CEO belongs to, we 
observe a monotonic reduction in bank performance under competitive pressure as we move 
from CEOs who are second-generation descendants of immigrants to later generations. Further, 
the Gen2-3 effect we document is uniquely linked to the CEO and cannot be detected for other 
senior executives, such as the CFO or other members of a bank’s top management team.  
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Second, we demonstrate that the descendants-of-immigrants effect is rooted in culture 
(rather than other characteristics shared by Gen2-3 CEOs). To do so, we trace the performance 
effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs back to specific cultural values that prevail in the country of a 
CEOs’ ancestors. Using a broad range of 16 cultural dimensions obtained from Hofstede, 
Hofstede, and Minkov (2010), Schwartz (2007), GLOBE and the World Value Survey (WVS), 
we find that most cultural dimensions (10 out of 16) explain competitive performance.  
The cultural values that enter significantly appear to broadly contrast group- vs. self-
oriented cultures and cultures related to attitudes towards uncertain future outcomes. 
Specifically, we find that competitive performance is positively related to the cultural 
dimensions Restraint, Long-term Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Harmony and is 
negatively related to Individualism, Performance-orientation, Importance of Freedom, 
Intellectual Autonomy, Importance of Selflessness, and Patriotism. Our findings are consistent 
with the leadership literature which considers group-mindedness and foresight as desirable 
managerial traits (e.g., Den Hartog et al., 1999) and links short-termism to unsustainable 
investment behavior and poor long-term prospects (e.g., Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Porter, 
1992).2 The economic magnitudes of most cultural variables are substantially larger than the 
descendants-of-immigrants effect (Gen2-3) on competitive performance. Again, this confirms 
our interpretation that culture is the key driver behind the Gen2-3 effects.  
                                                            
2 Given the large number of cultural dimensions we examine, interpreting each individual dimension becomes a 
complex undertaking. Further, the results on the individual dimensions suggest that some cultural dimensions cluster 
to represent more general characteristics of different cultural heritages (e.g., the group-mindedness of a culture). 
Therefore, we employ a factor analysis, a common empirical approach to identify multifaceted personalities and 
traits (e.g., Adams, Akyol, and Verwijmeren, 2016; Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013; Kaplan, Klebanov, and 
Sorensen 2012; Kaplan and Sorensen, 2016), and assign the 16 cultural variables to more general sets of cultural 
characteristics. We find that the 16 individual dimensions can be grouped into 3 factors. The first factor contrasts 
self-oriented with group-oriented values, the second factor contrasts empowered with hierarchical values while the 
third factor is related to assertiveness and autonomy. We obtain similar interpretation when linking the three factors 
(instead of the 16 individual dimensions) to competitive performance. 
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In contrast, the cultural dimensions Importance of Income Equality, Humane-orientation, 
Trust in Others, Power Distance, and Masculinity do not explain competitive performance. 
These dimensions mainly revolve around values reflecting hierarchy vs equality which, 
intuitively, should be less relevant to strategic decision-making and firm outcomes. 
The final set of tests offers direct evidence on the culture-performance nexus. We show 
that a CEO’s cultural heritage affects performance by shaping the strategies CEOs undertake. 
Specifically, we find that when competition intensifies, banks led by CEOs whose ancestral 
origins lie in cultures that emphasize restraint, group-mindedness and long-term orientation (i) 
engage in fewer acquisitions, (ii) realize higher acquisition announcement returns, (iii) display 
lower risk, and (iv) are more cost efficient. Since cultural heritage effects can be traced to more 
granular policy choices, it offers an explanation for why culture matters to performance.  
We rule out several alternative interpretations for our findings. First, we address 
identification concerns related to endogenous CEO-bank matching. Unobserved firm 
heterogeneity may simultaneously explain the matching between banks and Gen2-3 CEOs as 
well as bank policies. Our IBBEA identification already partially mitigates this issue. Since 
banks will not know ex-ante whether and when a state opens to interstate competition3, they 
cannot plausibly appoint CEOs in anticipation of this event. We present two additional tests to 
show that endogenous CEO-bank matching is unlikely to drive our results. We first compare 
CEOs who assume office at least three years before a state opens for deregulation (these 
appointments are plausibly exogenous to performance post-deregulation) with CEOs who 
assume office within three years of deregulation. We do not find any difference in the effect of 
                                                            
3 We construct several validation tests to ensure that the IBBEA shock is indeed unforeseen by individual banks and 
CEOs. For instance, we employ the methodology of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and examine the dynamics of 
bank profitability and risk-taking surrounding the period of deregulation. We find that there is no prior trend in bank 
profitability, which confirms the validity of the shock.   
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CEOs on performance depending on how long before IBBEA CEOs were appointed. We then 
use a set of exogenous CEO turnovers (those arising from CEO death, illness or long-planned 
retirements) and confirms that Gen2-3 are linked to an increase in competitive performance.  
Second, deregulation may not affect all banks within the same state uniformly. For 
instance, out-of-state banks may be more likely to open new branches in local areas with the 
most growth potential, and if banks located in these areas were headed by Gen4+ CEOs, our 
results may simply reflect the fact that these banks face stiffer competition. We address this by 
showing that our results are robust to controlling for county-year fixed effects. This set-up allows 
us to compare banks located in the same county and year (which are likely to share the same 
customer base, face the same investment cycle and local competition) but have CEOs with 
different ancestral backgrounds. 
Finally, we address concerns that omitted variables at the level of the CEO, bank location 
or a CEO’s country of origin explain our results. In additional tests, we control for various CEO 
characteristics (including demographic, career history and pay incentives), county-level variables 
(population, labor force, income per capita, and religiosity) and institutional and economic 
variables in a CEO’s ancestral country of origin (GDP per capita, life expectancy and the legal 
system). Our results remain robust to including these controls. 
Our paper contributes to several active research areas. First, our paper is related to the 
growing literature that studies the impact of CEO attributes on corporate outcomes. Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) identify significant time-invariant ‘managerial styles’ in a range of policy choices. 
Various studies have subsequently attempted to explain heterogeneity in managerial styles with 
reference to a manager’s physiology (Adams, Keloharju and Knüpfer, 2016), life experiences 
(Bernile, Bhagwat and Rau, 2016; Crongvist and Yu, 2016), or career experience (Custodio and 
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Metzger, 2013; Dittmar and Duchin, 2016; Schoar and Zuo, 2016). Our findings make an 
important contribution to this line of research, because they can be interpreted as evidence 
pointing to some of the origins of time-invariant manager heterogeneity.  
Second, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that culture is slow-moving and 
that the effects of cultural heritage are more pervasive than previously reported in a literature that 
links cultural heritage to personal choices such as labor force participation or family planning 
(e.g., Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Giavazzi, Petkov and Schiantarelli, 2015; Giuliano, 2007). Our 
study implies that the effects of cultural heritage go beyond personal decisions and affect entire 
organizations through their effects on various firm-level policies.4   
Finally, we document distinct behavior among CEOs who are second- and third-
generation immigrants, offer an explanation for this based on cultural heritage and show that this 
effect fades away over successive generations. We do so by collecting a unique dataset that maps 
out the family trees of CEOs using detailed genealogical data. Collectively, our paper therefore 
offers novel insights into the formation and persistence of an individual’s cultural preferences 
(e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001; Robalino and Robson, 2013).  
 
1. Data and identification  
1.1 Bank sample and CEO ancestry information   
Our paper studies how a CEO’s cultural heritage shapes the way banks react to the staggered 
liberalization of interstate branching since the 1990s. We build a sample of publicly-listed US 
banks between 1994-2006 by matching data on commercial banks and bank holding company 
call reports (forms FFIEC 031/041 and FR Y-9C) with market data from the Center for Research 
                                                            
4 In a related study, Pan, Siegel and Wang (2016) find that uncertainty avoiding CEOs are less likely to undertake 
acquisitions. This is consistent with our paper where we link various cultural variables, including uncertainty 
avoidance, to the firm’s acquisition propensity.   
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in Securities Price (CRSP). We choose this sampling period because 1994 is the first year in 
which states were allowed to introduce regulatory barriers and 2006 is one year after the last 
regulatory change was enacted. We then complement this sample with data from ExecuComp, 
BoardEx and Edgar DEF14A forms to retrieve a range of demographic information on CEOs. 
This yields a sample of 939 CEOs serving 726 US banks.  
To obtain data on the ancestry of CEOs, we proceed as follows. Our main source of 
ancestry information are Census Bureau records accessed via ancestry.com, the world’s largest 
genealogy database. The exact approach we use to identify ancestral information depends on 
when a CEO was born. 
Since the latest publicly available Census Bureau records stem from the 1940 census5, we 
can retrieve ancestry information for all 209 CEOs born before 1940 directly from census 
records. Census records contain detailed demographic information on all members of a 
household (including names, birth dates and places of birth). We start by locating a CEO’s 
census records to obtain information on their parents (and their respective places of birth). If both 
parents are born outside the US, we classify a CEO as a second-generation immigrant from the 
country in which their parents were born. If either parent is born in the US, we continue to locate 
earlier census records of a CEO’s parents to identify the CEO’s grandparents. If the CEO’s 
grandparents are born outside the US, the CEO is classified as a third-generation immigrant from 
the country in which his/her grandfather is born. Otherwise, we continue our search using earlier 
census records as far back as data availability permits, usually to the mid-19th century.  
For the 730 CEOs born after 1940 (about 78% of the sample), we use two approaches to 
collect ancestry information. The first approach relies on the fact that since all the parents of 
                                                            
5 The US Census Bureau conducts a population count every 10 years in years ending with a zero. However, in order 
to protect the privacy of those who are alive, the census records are only made publicly available for viewing 72 
years after the original census day. 
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sample CEOs are born before 1940, their census records are accessible. If we know the names of 
a CEO’s parents (via ancestry.com or other public sources), we can map out the parents’ family 
tree and locate their ancestors using the same technique we use for CEOs born before 1940 (as 
describe above). To do this, we search ancestry.com for a CEO’s birth and marriage certificates 
which occasionally list the names of parents.6 If we cannot identify a CEOs parents this way, we 
search a CEO’s biographies, interviews, or obituaries for information on their parents.  
When we cannot identify the parents of a CEO, we use a second approach that lets us 
infer ancestry information where this information cannot be directly sourced from census 
records. Specifically, we can infer a CEO’s heritage if all families with the same surname as the 
CEO and live in the birth county of the CEO have immigrated to the US from the same country 
and the same number of generations ago.  
The following example illustrates this approach. Say, we search for ancestors of a CEO 
with the surname Pantilione who is born in 1945 in Cumberland County, New Jersey7. To do 
this, we search Census records for all Pantilione families that live in Cumberland County, N.J. in 
1940. Census records indicate that two families with the surname Pantilione live in Cumberland 
County in 1940 and that both families emigrated from Italy at about the same time. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that the CEO will be born to one of these two families in 1945 and is of 
Italian ancestry.8 Crucially, if we were to discover inconsistencies regarding a CEO’s origins 
(e.g., one Pantilione family emigrated from Italy and one from Poland or the families arrived in 
                                                            
6 The richness of information in birth or marriage certificates varies significantly across the county and state.  
7 We identify a CEO’s birthplace from various sources, including ancestry.com’s School Yearbooks, Marquis Who’s 
Who, NNDB.com, LinkedIn, or through extensive Google searches of public data sources. 
8 This strategy relies on some assumptions. First, the CEO’s family does not move house between 1940 and 1945. 
Second, there is no new arrivals with the same surname moving to Cumberland County between 1940 and 1945. We 
latter show that our results are robust to restricting the analyses to CEOs born before 1940. The pre-1940 data rely 
on information directly obtained from census records. 
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the US in different generations), we remove that CEO from the sample to maintain a high level 
of precision when identifying cultural heritage of CEOs. 
In total, we are able to find ancestry information for 406 out of 730 CEOs born after 
1940. Combined with the 209 CEOs born before 1940, this gives us a sample of 615 CEOs. In 
subsequent sections, we expand this detailed collection of ancestry data to other senior 
executives to test whether the cultural heritage effects are extended to non-CEO executives.   
Throughout the paper, we restrict our sample to CEOs where the paternal and maternal 
ancestors originate from the same country and migrate to the US the same number of generations 
ago. This ensures that the cultural heritage of CEOs is clearly identifiable. CEOs of mixed 
ancestry may have inherited values from both cultures or from a single culture, depending on 
cultural and personal factors we cannot observe. Fortunately for our analysis, cross-cultural 
intermarriages were not common amongst 20th century immigrants (e.g., Kalmijn, 1999; Pagnini 
and Morgan, 1990). Fewer than 15% of CEOs are classed as mixed ancestry. In unreported tests, 
we also find that mixed-ancestry CEOs are not associated with any performance difference under 
competitive pressure, consistent with the notion that these CEOs do not inherit a cultural heritage 
that is distinct from the CEO population.  
A major advantage of our approach is that it provides precise information on the 
immigrant generation and origin of the CEO’s ancestors. Several contemporaneous studies (e.g., 
Du, Yu and Yu, 2016; Pan, Siegel and Wang, 2016) rely on surnames to infer ancestral origin 
which is a noisier approach. For instance, a person with the surname Welch could come from 
Britain, Ireland or Germany. The flipside of targeting such a high level of accuracy in 
determining a CEO’s heritage is that we lose 44% post-1940 CEOs whose heritage we cannot 
identify precisely. To account for potential self-selection, we base all our regression models on a 
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standard Heckman two-step procedure (1979). This procedure ensures that our conclusions 
regarding CEO heritage and other factors that drive bank performance are not driven by 
unobservable factors that make sample inclusion more likely.9 
 
1.2 Identification: Competitive pressures in the US banking sector 
To study how a CEO’s cultural heritage effects firm outcomes, we employ a methodology 
similar to Opler and Titman (1994) and Yonker (2016). The basic idea is that causality is 
identified through a series of unexpected shocks at industry-level that force a CEO to act. Since 
the ensuing decisions are non-routine, complex and unstructured, CEO characteristics such as 
cultural heritage are likely to be salient in shaping how firms respond to a changing industry 
environment.  
We use the staggered liberalization of interstate branching in the 1990s, which introduces 
an unexpected and significant increase in industry competition at the level of individual states as 
shocks that are unanticipated by banks (see Cornaggia et al., 2015). Before 1994, interstate 
branching is largely prohibited and there is almost no out-of-state bank branching. The Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 allows unrestricted interstate banking 
and interstate branching across the US from 1997. IBBEA leads to an exponential growth of 
                                                            
9 The first step of the Heckman procedure estimates the probability that banks are included in our sample using data 
on banks included as well as banks we are unable to include in our sample due to data restrictions. Identification 
rests on the exclusion restriction that requires the first stage to be estimated using a set of variables that is larger by 
at least one variable than the set of variables in the second stage. Because CEOs with longer surnames are more 
likely to be uniquely identified (e.g., Pantilione vs. Mike), the length of the CEO’s surname affects the likelihood 
that this CEO is included in the sample. Therefore, we use the length of the CEO’s surname as an additional variable 
that is included in the first but not the second stage. At the same time, this instrument is plausibly exogenous to bank 
performance (the correlation between the length of a CEO’s surname and bank ROA is -0.03 and is statistically 
insignificant). The first-stage results are shown in Appendix 3. The second stage of the Heckman procedure (as 
shown in the tables in this paper) include Lambda which contains information from the first step to control for 
unobservable factors which make sample inclusion more likely.  
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banking activities across state borders. While there are only 64 out-of-state banks in 1994, this 
number increases to 24,000 by 2005 (Johnson and Rice, 2008).  
Our identification strategy relies on a unique feature of IBBEA: the ability of individual 
US states to block competition by adopting barriers against deregulation any time between the 
passage of IBBEA in September 1994 and its effective date in July 1997. Further, some US 
states continue to revise their branching barriers until 2005, providing further variation in 
competitive pressures. The key advantage of our identification is that different states enact the 
roadblocks at different points in time, which gives us multiple competitive shocks that vary 
across states and time. Further, this decision is made at state level and cannot be anticipated by 
individual banks and the CEO. Therefore, this offers an experimental setting to gauge how CEOs 
react to changes in competitive pressures that are exogenous to the bank that they work for (Rice 
and Strahan, 2010). 
Specifically, IBBEA grants US states the option to: (1) impose a minimum age of three 
years on target institutions of interstate acquirers; (2) not to permit de novo interstate branching; 
(3) not to permit the acquisition of individual branches by an out-of-state bank; and (4) block 
out-of-state banks from acquiring an in-state bank that holds more than 30% of the deposits in 
that state. We define a state to be competitive if it chooses not to adopt either (3) or (4). This is 
because the requirements on age and de novo interstate branching can be easily circumvented or 
their effects are subsumed to those of (3) and (4) (Johnson and Rice, 2008).10 Appendix 1 lists all 
changes by state and year. 
 
                                                            
10 Column (6) of Appendix 9 shows that our results remain robust to using all four roadblock provisions.  
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2. Empirical results  
2.1 Difference-in-Differences test: Baseline specification  
Our empirical strategy adopts a difference-in-differences (DiD) method to analyze how a CEO’s 
cultural heritage affects a bank’s reaction to a shock in industry competition. This approach 
exploits (1) within-state variation in a CEO’s cultural heritage across banks and (2) across- and 
within-state variation in competitive pressures across time.11 The latter is exogenously created by 
the adoption of roadblocks to interstate competition permitted under IBBEA (Cornaggia et al., 
2015; Rice and Strahan, 2010). Our main outcome variable is Return on Assets (ROA).12  
The following example illustrates our empirical approach. Consider two identical banks – 
Bank 1 and Bank 2 – both headquartered in New York in 1996. Bank 1 has a Gen2-3 CEO while 
Bank 2 has a Generation4+ CEO. The state of New York decided against adopting roadblocks to 
interstate branching on 6 January 1997 exposing both banks to a sudden increase in industry 
competition. This allows us to relate post-shock performance differences across these banks to 
the cultural heritage of a CEO. In addition, our identification also utilizes Bank 3 and Bank 4, 
which are both headquartered in California, one with a Gen2-3 CEO and one with a 
Generation4+ CEO. Crucially, California does not experience an increase in competition in 
1997. Therefore, Banks 3 and 4 absorb the general economic conditions as well as differences 
that are specific to banks led by CEOs of a certain cultural heritage.  
We control for several bank and CEO characteristics. First, we control for the size of the 
bank using the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Since the size distribution of 
US banks is highly skewed, we also include its square term, Ln (asset)2, to account for possible 
                                                            
11 Column (7) of Appendix 9 shows that our results remain robust to using an alternative specification that only 
exploits within-state variation. 
12 Several recent studies (e.g., Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) use ROA as a proxy for bank performance. Our results are 
also robust to other market and accounting measures of bank performance (see Section 5.4). 
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non-linearity between the bank size and performance (see, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)). Further, 
we control for heterogeneity in banks’ balance sheets using the ratios Deposits/Assets, 
Loans/Assets and Liabilities/Assets. We use stock volatility to control for bank risk and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of deposits by state and year to control for state-level 
concentration of banking activities. Finally, we control for CEO characteristics by including the 
natural logarithm of the CEO age and tenure, as well as their square terms. This is to account for 
the non-linearity between CEO career horizons and his/her behavior (see, for instance, Custodio 
and Metzger (2013)). Our result is robust to controlling for several additional measures of CEO 
unobserved and observed heterogeneity. Table 1 reports the summary statistics.  
[Tables 1 & 2 around here] 
Before conducting our multivariate analysis, we confirm that the assignment of banks to 
competitive and non-competitive states is random (as indicated by the two groups not being 
significantly different). We compare the characteristics of the treatment group (banks located in 
states that eventually liberalize interstate branching) to the control group (banks located in non-
competitive states) in the fiscal year before treatment takes place (i.e. a state liberalizes interstate 
branching). Panel A of Table 2 shows that there are no statistically significant differences in 
bank performance (ROA), bank risk (measured by stock volatility and leverage) or the 
distribution of Gen2-3 CEOs across treatment and control banks. Further, treatment and control 
banks are also similar in terms of other key control variables (size, lending, deposit, CEO age 
and tenure).  
Next, we check whether the parallel assumption holds in our sample of treatment and 
control banks. The parallel assumption states that in the absence of treatment (deregulation), the 
coefficient on the DiD estimator is zero. Thus, it requires a similar pre-event trend for both 
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treatment and control groups. Panel B of Table 2 calculates the growth rates in bank profitability 
(ROA) and bank risk (leverage and stock volatility) one- and two-years prior to shocks and find 
no statistically significant differences between treatment and control banks. This suggests that 
the parallel trend assumption is likely to hold. In the multivariate regressions, we further control 
for pre-trends in the data by including state-year trends fixed effects.   
 
2.2 Multivariate results  
Next, we perform DiD tests in a multivariate framework. We estimate the following model:  
ROAitk = α + β1Gen2-3 CEOit*Competitive statetk + β2Gen2-3 CEOit  
+ β3Competitive statetk + Controls + Fixed effects + εitk                     (1) 
                  
where t indexes time, i indexes banks and k indexes US states. The dependent variable is ROA. 
Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if the state does not block key dimensions of 
interstate branching between 1994 and 2005 under powers granted following the passage of 
IBBEA (see Section 1.2 for more details on those powers). Our coefficient of interest is the 
interaction term β1, which tells us how the profitability of banks with Gen2-3 and Gen4+ CEOs 
differs under the two different competitive regimes.  
Our controls include bank and CEO characteristics as described in Section 2.1. We also 
control for Gen1 (i.e., foreign-born) CEO to ensure that the coefficients on Gen2-3 estimate the 
performance difference of second and third generation immigrants relative to later generation 
immigrants. Various types of fixed effects are included in the models (such as firm, state-year 
trends, and county-year fixed effects). We also account for the interactive effects of regulatory 
changes on bank performance by including interaction terms between competitive state and all 
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controls in our model.13 Standard errors are double-clustered by bank and year to account for 
temporal and cross-sectional correlation (Petersen, 2009).  
[Table 3 around here] 
Table 3 indicates that Gen2-3 CEOs exert a detectable performance difference relative to 
other CEOs, implying that these CEOs behave differently from the CEO population. The 
interaction term between Gen2-3 CEO and competitive state is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. When competition increases, banks led by CEOs who are the children 
or grandchildren of immigrants exhibit a 6.2% increase in ROA compared to an average CEO. 
The magnitude of Gen2-3 is therefore higher than that of important controls such as deposit 
funding or state-level (HHI) competition (each about 3%). Further, the coefficient on Gen2-3 
picks up the aggregate effect of Gen2-3 CEOs on bank performance. The economic magnitudes 
become even more pronounced when we directly link specific cultural dimensions to 
performance in the sections below.  
In contrast, the coefficient on Gen2-3 is negative and significant. While an F-test in Panel 
B confirms that the net effect of Gen2-3 CEOs under competitive pressure is indeed positive and 
statistically significant, our results suggest that the qualities of Gen2-3 CEOs that link to superior 
performance when state-level competition increases also link to underperformance under less 
competitive market conditions. We revisit this finding later and explain it based on cultural 
values that prevail in the CEO’s ancestral country of origin.  
Our findings hold under different fixed effect models. We sequentially add state and year 
fixed effects (column 1), state-year fixed effects (column 2) to absorb all variables that do not 
vary across banks within a given state and year (e.g., investment opportunities or business 
cycles), state-year trends fixed effects (column 3) to control for pre-trends in the data, county-
                                                            
13 For brevity, we do not report the interaction terms between competitive state and the controls in the tables. 
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year fixed effects (column 4) to control for within-state omitted factors, and firm fixed effects 
(column 5) to control for time-invariant firm-specific factors. Finally, column (6) replicates the 
model in column (1) but excludes the inverse Mills ratio. 
 
2.3 Inter-generational transmission of culture 
We next analyze whether the effect that CEOs have on performance varies according to how 
many generations ago a CEO’s ancestors arrived in the US. The previous literature indicates that 
the values of successive generations of immigrants slowly converge to US values (see, for 
example, Giavazzi, Petkov and Schiantarelli, 2015). This suggests that the effects we document 
above should be stronger for earlier generation of immigrants compared with higher generation 
immigrants. Table 4 reports the results.  
[Table 4 around here] 
In line with this expectation, we observe a monotonic decline in the magnitude of the 
effect that CEOs have on performance when moving from first-generation to fourth-generation 
immigrant CEOs. While Gen1, Gen2, and Gen3 CEOs are associated with a significant and 
positive performance under pressure, the coefficient estimate for Gen1 CEOs is larger than that 
of Gen2, which in turn is larger than that of Gen3 CEOs.14 This positive effect disappears when 
we examine Gen4 CEOs.  
 
2.4 The cultural heritage of non-CEO top executives 
                                                            
14 We are cautious when interpreting the positive coefficient on Gen1 CEOs as due to cultural heritage. Since Gen1 
CEOs are born outside the US, they differ from second- and later-generation CEOs in more than just their cultural 
heritage. Gen1 CEOs experience different economic, social and legal influences which makes it difficult to attribute 
the observed performance effect of Gen1 CEOs to cultural heritage.  
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In this section, we examine whether the performance effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs extends 
beyond the CEO. Recent studies show that top executives other than the CEO matter for some 
firm outcomes. For instance, Dittmar and Duchin (2016) find that the professional experience of 
the CEO and the CFO each have distinct effects on a firm’s financial policies. Pan, Siegel and 
Wang (2016) document commonalities in the risk attitudes of a firm’s top management team and 
show that risk attitudes within the top management team shape a firm’s risk taking. 
To test whether the cultural heritage of non-CEO top executives explains how banks react 
to an increase in competition, we collect data on the cultural heritage of the four highest paid 
non-CEO executives across all banks.  We obtain the name, age, tenure and total compensation 
from ExecuComp (for S&P 1500 banks) and from Edgar DEF14A forms (for smaller banks).15 
To identify the ancestral heritage of non-CEO top executives, we employ the same data 
collection approach we use for CEOs (see Section 1.1). In total, we are able to locate the ancestry 
information for 2,462 out of 3,416 executives in office between 1994 and 2006. 
[Table 5 around here] 
Our regression specifications focus on three groups of non-CEO executives: (1) The 
second-highest paid executive; (2) the CFO, and (3) the team of the four most highly paid non-
CEO executives. We use the same DiD approach with identical controls as in equation (1). Table 
5 reports the results. Columns (1)-(3) control for ancestry information on non-CEO executives, 
while columns (4)-(6) control for ancestry information on CEOs and non-CEO executives 
simultaneously. 
As shown in Table 5, the interaction terms between Gen2-3 and any of the groups of non-
CEO executives we analyze do not enter significantly. Crucially, Gen2-3 CEOs continue to be 
                                                            
15  Following Kim and Lu (2016), we focus our analyses on the five highest-paid executives (based on total 
compensation). Next to the CEO, the group of top-five executives typically includes the Chairman, President, Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), CFO, and the Senior or Executive Vice President  
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significantly associated with higher competitive performance after we control for the ancestry 
information of non-CEO executives.16 Overall, our results buttress the view that because CEOs 
are the most important decision-maker in a bank, their cultural heritage exerts a detectable effect 
on bank performance in how banks respond to a changing industry environment. No such effects 
are detectable for other senior executives. 
3 The impact of CEO cultural values on firm performance  
The previous sections show that Gen2-3 CEOs behave differently from the general population of 
CEOs and that this effect varies across immigrant generations. To demonstrate that the 
descendants-of-immigrants effects are due to culture, rather than other characteristics shared by 
Gen2-3 CEOs, this section traces the performance effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs back to specific 
cultural values that prevail in the country of a CEOs’ ancestors.  
 
3.1 Cultural values   
We obtain cultural variables from four prominent cultural databases: Hofstede, Schwartz, 
GLOBE and the World Value Survey. In total, we collect data for 16 cultural variables. While 
any selection of individual cultural variables remains arbitrary to some extent, our approach of 
collecting a relatively large number of cultural variables from different sources is designed to 
minimize the effects of arbitrary choices that are linked to any individual cultural index on our 
conclusions.  
We start with the cultural variables identified by Geert Hofstede, because this framework 
has been widely applied across many disciplines. We use all six Hofstede dimensions: Power 
Distance indicates the importance of hierarchy in a culture, Individualism vs Collectivism reflects 
                                                            
16 Of course, the cultural heritage of non-CEO executives may well shape decision-making in their particular areas 
of responsibilities. However, our results indicate that such effects are not traceable in aggregate firm performance. 
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the integration of individuals in groups, Uncertainty Avoidance is the extent to which individuals 
are not comfortable with unpredictability and ambiguity, Masculinity vs Femininity is describes 
‘tough versus tender’ cultures, Long-term vs Short-term Orientation is related to (short term) 
normative versus (long term) pragmatic cultures, and Restraint vs Indulgence reflects the extent 
to which members of a society try to control their desires and impulses.  
Despite its popularity, Hofstede’s framework faces criticisms notably for its reliance on 
theoretical reasoning to construct a relatively low number of cultural dimensions (see Karolyi 
(2016) for a critical review of the key databases used to measure differences in cultural values). 
Therefore, we complement Hofstede’s cultural dimensions with additional cultural variables not 
captured in Hofstede’s framework.17 
We first consider the cultural variables developed by Schwartz (2007), who derives three 
broad measures of societal traits based on extensive interviews conducted between 1988 and 
2004. While many of the Schwartz spectra are similar to Hofstede’s dimensions, two Schwartz 
variables capture additional cultural attributes which we include in our analysis: Intellectual 
Autonomy vs Embeddedness reflects the freedom to pursue own thoughts and ideas, and 
Harmony vs Mastery captures the degree to which members of a society are uncomfortable with 
confrontation and assertiveness. 
We then add variables from the GLOBE database.18 Since seven out of nine of GLOBE’s 
cultural dimensions overlap with dimensions already included, we add the two dimensions that 
capture additional cultural attributes: Humane-orientation, which reflects the extent to which a 
                                                            
17 In unreported tests, we also contrast cultural dimensions where Hofstede and other dimensions directly overlap 
and find that they explain competitive performance in a similar manner. For instance, regardless of whether we 
measure Uncertainty Avoidance using Hofstede or GLOBE, it is associated with higher competitive performance 
later on in our analysis.   
18The project was launched in the early 1990s by Robert House, and now involves over 200 scholars from 62 
countries. See https://test.uvic.ca/gustavson/globe/about/index.php. 
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society encourages individuals to be altruistic, generous and kind to others, and Performance-
orientation, which reflects the extent to which a society encourages and rewards performance. 
Our final source of cultural variables is the World Value Survey (WVS). There are six 
waves of surveys since 1981, and the most recent 2012 survey includes 258 items on various 
topics, including perceptions of life, work, politics and society. Given the comprehensive nature 
of the survey, we start with the 14 WVS items that Karolyi (2016) identifies as particularly 
relevant for finance research. Out of this list, we select six items that capture attributes not 
already captured by other cultural dimensions in our analysis: Trust in Others, Importance of 
Freedom, Importance of Selflessness, Importance of Income Equality, Importance of Self-
respect, and Patriotism.  
 
3.2 Cultural values and competitive performance   
To examine how the 16 cultural dimensions explain competitive performance, we first scale each 
dimension to a range between 0 and 1. We then assign cultural values to CEOs according to their 
ancestral background.19 We sequentially relate each cultural dimension to bank performance 
under competitive pressure by running the following model: 
ROAitk = α + β1Cultural dimensionit*Competitive statetk + β2Cultural dimensionit  
+ β3 Competitive statetk + Controls + Fixed effects + εitk                     (2) 
 
where i indexes bank, t indexes time and k indexes US states. We include similar controls to 
those in equation (1) and use State-year fixed effects in all specifications.  
                                                            
19 For example, if a CEO has ancestors coming from Germany, s/he will be assigned a Power Distance score of 0.35, 
an Uncertainty Avoidance score of 0.65 and so on. 
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Table 6 sequentially displays the results for each of the 16 cultural dimensions. Each row 
presents the results of a regression based on a different cultural dimension. For ease of 
presentation, we only show the coefficients on the interaction between the cultural dimension 
and the state-level competition indicator (β1) and its constituent variables (β2, β3). Our main 
coefficient of interest is β1 which tells us how the profitability of banks with CEOs with different 
cultural values differs by competitive regime.  
[Table 6 around here] 
The results show that most (10 out of 16) of the cultural variables significantly affect 
competitive performance. On a broad level, this confirms our interpretation that the performance 
effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs is indeed rooted in culture. More specifically, we find that 
competitive performance is positively related to the dimensions of Restraint, Long-term 
Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Harmony. In contrast, performance is negatively related 
to the dimensions of Individualism, Performance-orientation, Importance of Freedom, 
Intellectual Autonomy, Importance of Selflessness and Patriotism.  
In general terms, the cultural values that enter significantly appear to broadly contrast 
group- vs. self-oriented cultures and cultures related to attitudes towards uncertain future 
outcomes. Specifically, CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that emphasize restraint, 
group-mindedness and long-term orientation are associated with positive performance effects 
while a cultural heritage that values personal freedom and tolerates uncertainty is linked to 
underperformance following a competitive shock.  
These findings are broadly in line with the leadership and strategy literature. For instance, 
Den Hartog et al. (1999) conduct a large multi-country survey of middle managers to describe 
leader attributes and behavior that is linked to effective leadership. Their results show that 
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managerial attributes such as group-mindedness and foresight are widely endorsed as 
contributing to outstanding leadership. In contrast, short-termism is generally considered a 
managerial attribute that is linked to unsustainable investment behavior and poor long-term 
prospects (e.g., Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Porter, 1992).  
The cultural dimensions that do not explain competitive performance are Importance of 
Income Equality, Importance of Self-respect, Humane-orientation, Trust in Others, Power 
Distance, and Masculinity. These dimensions mainly revolve around values reflecting hierarchy 
vs equality which, intuitively, should be less relevant to strategic decision-making and, by 
extension, firm outcomes. Consistent with this, Judge et al. (2002) conduct an extensive 
qualitative review and a meta-analysis of research into the personality traits of outstanding 
corporate leaders and do not list hierarchical attitudes as traits of effective leaders.  
The effects of individual cultural values on performance are economically meaningful. 
For instance, a one-standard deviation increase in Uncertainty Avoidance increases competitive 
performance by 9.4%, while a one-standard deviation increase in Individualism decreases 
competitive performance by 18.3%. Interestingly, the economic magnitudes of most cultural 
variables are substantially larger than the descendants-of-immigrants effect (Gen2-3 CEOs) on 
competitive performance. Again, this confirms our interpretation that culture is the key driver 
behind the Gen2-3 effects. 
In Section 4 below, we analyze how a CEO’s cultural heritage affects firm policies under 
competitive pressure. However, given the large number of cultural variables and firm policies we 
analyze, demonstrating how each dimension affects a particular policy becomes a complex 
undertaking. Furthermore, the results in Table 6 suggest that some individual cultural dimensions 
cluster around more general characteristics of national cultures (e.g., whether a culture is group- 
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or self-oriented). Therefore, we next employ factor analysis to assign the 16 cultural variables to 
more general sets of cultural characteristics and analyze which sets are relevant for performance 
and firm policy choices. 
 
3.3. Factor analysis: CEO factor scores and performance 
Factor analysis is a popular approach to summarize multifaceted personal characteristics such as 
abilities or skills (e.g., Adams, Akyol and Verwijmeren, 2016; Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorenson, 
2012; Kaplan and Sorenson, 2016). Factor analysis captures the variability among the cultural 
variables and reduces them to a lower number of factors that describe characteristics that tend to 
vary together. Our analysis extracts three main factors that summarize the main dimensions 
across which the 16 cultural variables vary.20   
[Table 7 around here] 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the three factors and how they load on individual cultural 
variables. Factor 1 captures most (54%) of the variation in cultural values. Factor 1 shows high 
positive loadings on Individualism, Performance-orientation, and Importance of Freedom and 
high negative loadings on Restraint, Long-term Orientation, Uncertainty Avoidance, and 
Harmony. 21  Factor 1 therefore describes a person who values personal freedom and is 
competitive and performance-oriented (in contrast to a person who emphasizes restraint, group-
mindedness and has long-term orientation). 
The second and third factors have significantly lower explanatory power and account for 
17% and 9% of the variation in the cultural dimensions, respectively. Factor 2 loads positively 
                                                            
20 The number of factors is determined by the Kaiser criterion that retains factors with eigenvalues ≥1. In our 
analysis, three factors satisfy this criterion (and jointly explain around 80% of the total variance in the cultural 
values).  
21 In line with the literature, we focus on variables with high loadings, i.e., those that are greater than |0.3|. The 
interpretation of the factors remain largely unchanged when we alternate this threshold.  
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on Importance of Income Equality, Humane-orientation, and Trust in Others and negatively on 
Power Distance. As such, Factor 2 seems to contrast being equal with hierarchical values. 
Finally, Factor 3 loads positively on Masculinity and Intellectual Autonomy. Factor 3, thus, 
combines assertiveness and autonomy in thought.  
Before proceeding with our analysis of how culture affects firm policies in Section 4, we 
first confirm that the three factors explain competitive performance in a way that is broadly 
consistent with the results based on the 16 individual dimensions in Table 6. We obtain the 
scores for each of the factor22 and then regress these on ROA using our previous DiD approach 
with identical controls as in equation (1).  
Panel B of Table 7 shows that Factor 1 is negatively related to performance under 
competitive pressure. That is, banks led by CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that 
value personal freedom are associated with lower performance. By the same token, this implies 
that CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that emphasize restraint, group-mindedness and 
long-term orientation are associated with positive performance effects. This is broadly consistent 
with the results on the individual dimensions reported in Table 6.23 In contrast, Factors 2 and 3 
are not related to competitive performance. This is also consistent with the results in Table 6 
which show that many of the cultural variables embedded in Factors 2 and 3 (e.g., Masculinity, 
Power Distance, etc.) do not have measurable performance effects. 
                                                            
22 Component scores are calculated using all of the variables with their weight based on the component loadings. 
23 Interestingly, the coefficient on Factor 1 is positive and significant. This indicates that the set of cultural values 
which is linked to underperformance following a competitive shock leads to outperformance in normal market 
times. CEOs with a high Factor 1 score are uncertainty-seeking and may therefore pursue a range of short-term 
expansionary corporate strategies that may well help the bank capture market shares. This is line with Pan, Siegel 
and Wang (2016) who show that firms whose managers have an ancestral background which scores low on 
Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance are linked to various risky outcomes. 
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Between them, the three factors therefore identify general characteristics of national 
cultures. In the next section, we use the three factors to study how culture values affect firm 
performance and policy choices.  
 
4. Why cultural heritage affects performance: CEO factor scores and firm policy choices  
This section sheds light on the economic mechanisms underlying our results by studying how 
CEO’s cultural heritage affects firm policies under competitive pressure. We regress the factor 
scores estimated above on specific bank policies in the same DiD setting as before. 24 We focus 
on three bank policies into which CEOs have major input and which parsimoniously capture the 
key challenges faced by banks during an episode of deregulation: expansion via acquisitions, 
risk-taking, and cost-efficiency. 
First, we examine how a CEO’s cultural heritage affects a bank’s propensity to engage in 
acquisitions as well as the expected performance effects of these acquisitions. For instance, 
banks may react to increased competition by rushing to acquire competitors, and many of these 
deals may turn out to be value-destroying for shareholders of the acquiring bank (e.g., 
Schoenberg and Reeves, 1999). We study a bank’s acquisition propensity by running a 
regression on the number of deals announced in a given year. We study acquisition performance 
by estimating the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a 5-day [-2, +2] event window 
surrounding the merger announcement.25 
                                                            
24 For ease of reporting, we link three factors (instead of 16 individual dimensions) to competitive performance. 
Consistent results are obtained when using the 16 individual dimensions. 
25 We focus on M&A deals that are publicly announced between 1994 and 2006 by US banks. We obtain data on 
bank acquisitions from Thomson Financial’s merger database (SDC). All deals must be at least $250 million and be 
subsequently completed.  We drop all observations where there is missing data or when other major news is released 
on the same day. This yields a sample of 264 deals.  
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Second, the ability of banks to manage portfolio and financing risks effectively is an 
important driver of their performance. Particularly during periods of deregulation, some CEOs 
may pursue overly risky strategies that could lead to underperformance. We use stock return 
volatility as a proxy for bank risk-taking. Finally, some banks may enjoy a higher level of 
profitability because they cut costs when competition intensifies. To proxy for cost-efficiency, 
we measure a bank’s total expenses scaled by income. Lower values of this ratio indicate more 
economical use of expenses to produce a given level of income. 
Table 8 reports our results. Panel A examines acquisition propensity, Panel B acquisition 
performance, Panel C bank risk-taking, and Panel D cost-efficiency. 
[Table 8 around here] 
Our previous analysis shows that CEOs whose cultural heritage loads negatively on 
Factor 1 (i.e., those whose cultural heritage places emphasis on restraint, group-mindedness and 
long-term orientation) are linked to higher performance under increased competition. Table 8 
offers some evidence that explains this result. The results show that CEOs who load negatively 
on Factor 1 are linked to banks that, following an increase in competitive pressures, (i) engage in 
fewer acquisitions26, (ii) realize higher acquisition announcement returns, (iii) display lower 
volatility, and (iv) are more cost efficient. Jointly, this offers an explanation for why CEOs 
whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that place an emphasis on restraint, group-mindedness and 
long-term orientation are linked to higher performance under competitive pressure. Factors 2 and 
3 do not exert a significant influence on any of the bank policy choices we analyze, which is 
                                                            
26 Our finding is consistent with Pan, Siegel and Wang (2016), who find that uncertainty avoiding CEOs (which is 
one of the cultural dimensions underlying Factor 1) are less likely to undertake acquisitions. This finding is also 
related to Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2015), who find that national cultural differences influence merger volume 
and gains in cross-border mergers.  
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consistent with our analysis of cultural value sets on ROA (where neither factor affects 
performance). 
 
5. Alternative explanations and robustness tests   
5.1. Alternative explanations based on CEO-firm matching  
CEOs and firms do not match randomly. CEOs with certain desired characteristics could be 
strategically appointed to take firms in a direction determined by the board. If ancestry was a 
criterion for the appointment of a particular CEO, endogenous matching between CEOs and 
firms could bias our results. Our IBBEA identification partially mitigates concerns over CEO-
firm matching, because banks that do not know whether and when a state would open for 
interstate competition cannot appoint CEOs in anticipation of this event.  
To further alleviate concerns over CEO-firm matching, we conduct two additional tests. 
First, we split our sample into two subsamples: The first subsample contains CEOs who assume 
office at least three years before a state opens for competition (that is, plausibly before changes 
in competition could have informed CEO selection and therefore, CEO appointment is plausibly 
exogenous to post-deregulation performance) and the second subsample contains CEOs who 
assume office within three years of deregulation. If unobserved matching were to drive our 
results, we would expect a stronger performance effect among recently hired CEOs. As shown in 
Panel A of Appendix 4, the effect of CEO ancestry is similar irrespective of whether a CEO was 
hired within three years of deregulation.  
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Second, we focus on exogenous CEO turnovers27 to identify banks that experience a 
shock to the ancestry of their CEO. Following Dittmar and Duchin (2016), we define CEO 
turnover events as exogenous if they meet one of the following conditions: the departing CEO 
dies, departs due to health-related reasons, is at least 60 years old, or the departure is part of a 
firm’s succession plan (with the date of departure announced in public at least six months prior 
to departure). To identify exogenous turnovers, we carefully read each firm’s press releases 
associated with the turnover events. We classify 72% of CEO turnovers in our sample as 
exogenous, consistent with 67% reported in Dittmar and Duchin (2016).  
Panel B of Appendix 4 estimates (i) a firm fixed effects panel regression on ROA based 
on banks that experience exogenous CEO turnover during the sample period; and (ii) difference 
regressions that compare bank performance two years prior to CEO turnover and two years 
afterwards (ΔROA, in percentages). This empirical design allows us to exploit cross-sectional 
variation within the subset of exogenous CEO turnovers. In both specifications, we exclude the 
turnover year to mitigate the effects of potential volatility in performance surrounding the 
turnover. The results show that when a new Gen2-3 CEO is appointed, banks enjoy an increase 
in performance after a competitive shock. These results hold across both regression models and 
further support a causal interpretation of our results.  
 
5.2. Omitted location and CEO variables 
It is possible that our Gen2-3 variable correlates with omitted location or CEO variables. One 
example of an omitted location variable is that immigrants tend to settle in populous areas. If 
banks located in populous areas are more likely to recruit talented CEOs, our results may simply 
                                                            
27 We focus on exogenous turnovers to ensure that CEO departures are not driven by poor performance or changes 
in firm policies. For example, if the turnover is driven by weak sales, any new CEO would implement the same 
policies to improve sales. This could add noise to our estimations.    
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reflect CEO talent. To address this, we control for additional location characteristics. Appendix 5 
shows that our results remain robust to controlling for various location variables at the county-
level:28 Ln (population), civilian labor force, Ln (personal income), and religiosity29. 
Further, omitted CEO characteristics could equally bias our results. For instance, 
immigrant households tend to invest heavily in the education of their children (Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2001), and our results could reflect the fact that Gen2-3 CEOs have more 
qualifications than other CEOs. In Appendix 6, we control for various observable CEO 
characteristics: whether a CEO graduated from an Ivy League university, holds an MBA degree, 
has prior work experience as a top executive, or has lived through the Great Depression. We also 
control for CEO incentives: CEO ownership (the fraction of shares held by the CEO), bonus 
payments, and risk-taking incentives relative to pay-performance sensitivity (vega/delta)30. The 
results in Appendix 6 show that controlling for additional CEO characteristics does not 
significantly alter the coefficients on Gen2-3 CEO, suggesting that cultural heritage is orthogonal 
to these factors. 
 
5.3. Legal and institutional heterogeneity in the CEO’s country of origin  
The key advantage of looking at Gen2-3 CEOs is that it allows us to hold constant the economic 
and institutional factors that all CEOs face while exploiting variation in the cultural values Gen2-
                                                            
28 Data on local religiosity is obtained from the Association of Religion Data Achieves (ARDA) and data on 
population and labor are from the US Census Bureau. 
29  Interestingly, our results show that banks located in more religious counties outperform under competitive 
pressure. This is consistent with Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) who find that banks located in religious counties tend 
to undertake more prudent policies. In contrast to Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) who focus on religion as a local 
factor external to firms, our paper mainly focuses on culture within firms by studying the ancestral backgrounds of 
CEOs.  
30 The sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank risk (vega) measures changes in CEO wealth to stock return volatility. The 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank performance (delta) measures changes in CEO wealth to stock price performance. 
We are grateful to Jeffery Coles, Naveen Daniel and Lalitha Naveen for sharing their data on CEO equity-based 
incentives online. Please refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) for detailed 
calculation of the variables. 
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3 inherit from their foreign-born ancestors. However, one could argue that the omitted 
institutional and economic factors at the time when a CEO’s ancestors immigrate to the US could 
drive our results. For instance, immigrants from the UK could belong to different socioeconomic 
strata than those from Russia (Carroll, Rhee and Rhee, 1994). To rule this out, we collect data for 
a CEO’s ancestral country of origin (in the year 1900) on GDP per capita, life expectancy and 
the legal system. As shown in Appendix 7, our results remain robust to the inclusion of the 
country controls. 
In unreported analyses, we confirm that CEOs with ancestry linked to countries with less 
developed capital markets (Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia) have a largely similar profile with 
those whose ancestry is linked to countries with more developed capital markets (UK and 
Ireland). Specifically, there is no statistical difference in age, tenure, education or executive 
experience between the two groups.  Collectively, this confirms that our results are unlikely to be 
driven by the differences among these two groups.    
 
5.4. Additional robustness tests    
This section presents additional robustness tests. First, we mitigate concerns that IBBEA can be 
anticipated by examining the dynamics of bank performance surrounding deregulation. 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we decompose Competitive state into five 
dummies associated with five periods: up to and including two years before deregulation 
(Before2+), one year before deregulation (Before1), the year of deregulation (Present), one year 
post-deregulation (After1), and two years and after post-deregulation (After2+). As indicated in 
Panel A of Appendix 8, the interaction terms with Before2+, Before1 and Gen2-3 CEOs are not 
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significant while interaction terms with Present, After1 After2 and Gen2-3 CEOs are significant. 
This shows that the shock does not appear to have been anticipated by banks.   
Second, there could be omitted factors, say macroeconomic conditions, coinciding with 
the timing of the shock that also affect bank performance. We address this by conducting a 
placebo test where we randomly (i.e., inaccurately) assign states to two competition categories. If 
omitted factors indeed drive our results, we should continue to find significant results even under 
this random assignment. As shown in Panel B of Appendix 8, the interaction term is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.  
Third, we use alternative performance measures. We replace ROA with returns on equity 
(ROE) and two market-based measures of performance: Tobin’s Q and Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES)31. As shown in columns (1)-(3) of Appendix 9, when competition intensifies, 
Gen2-3 CEOs are associated with a higher ROE and Tobin’s Q and a lower exposure to market 
downturns.   
Fourth, we address concerns that our data collection process could be noisy: while we can 
retrieve the census records of all CEOs born before 1940, we need to infer the ancestry 
information of CEOs born after 1940 based on their surname and birthplace. We split the sample 
into two groups: CEOs born before 1940 and those born after 1940 and show in columns (4) and 
(5) of Appendix 9 that our results are not driven by any particular group of CEOs.  
Fifth, we use an alternative definition of competitive state (#liberalizations), which takes 
into account all four regulatory barriers (instead of just two as above). As shown in column (6) of 
Appendix 9, our results are robust to this alternative definition of competitive pressures.  
                                                            
31 Following Acharya et al (2016), we calculate MES as the average return for each bank on days when the returns 
of the overall financial markets are in the bottom 5% in a given year. The more negative the MES measure, the 
worse returns of the individual bank when the return from the overall market is low.  
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Sixth, we use an alternative DiD set-up. Instead of using both within- and across-state 
variation, we restrict identification to within-state variation in CEO heritage. That is, we restrict 
the sample to competitive states only and assign banks with Gen2-3 CEOs to the treatment group 
and those with Gen4+ CEOs to the control group. Column (7) displays our robust results.  
Seventh, we test whether our results are driven by the quality of board governance. We 
include board size and the fraction of independent directors as additional controls. Board data are 
from BoardEx, Riskmetrics and Edgar DEF14A forms. Column (8) displays robust results.   
Eighth, banks located in rural areas could face less competition. If rural banks were led 
by Gen4+ CEOs, our results may simply reflect a large profitability drop when competition 
erodes non-competitive rents (rather than banks led by Gen2-3 CEOs outperform). We address 
this by controlling for bank profitability in 1994, i.e., the year before IBBEA becomes effective, 
and show in column (9) that our key results remain robust.  
Finally, one can argue that our measure of Gen2-3 CEOs could relate to a bank’s foreign 
operations. Banks with a view to expand internationally could be more likely to recruit a Gen2-3 
CEO. Following Berger et al. (2016), we control for a bank’s foreign operations using its foreign 
loan ratio and foreign deposit ratio. As shown in column (10), our results remain robust.  
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper advances and tests a new hypothesis on the link between the CEO cultural heritage 
and firm policy choices and performance in a changing industry environment. To distinguish 
culture from other institutional and economic factors, we focus on US-born CEOs who are the 
children or grandchildren of immigrants. To establish causality, we use a quasi-natural 
experiment – the staggered introduction of interstate branching (IBBEA) – as a source of 
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exogenous variation to industry competition. Our paper offers novel evidence on whether and 
how CEO cultural heritage causally affects organizational-level outcomes.   
We find that the cultural heritage of the CEO shapes the way a bank reacts to a changing 
industry environment. Banks led by a CEO with immigrant parents or grandparents are 
associated with higher profitability when competition intensifies. This effect is uniquely linked 
to the CEO and not to other senior decision-makers, such as the CFO. Further, this effect 
weakens over successive immigrant generations, and can be explained by specific inter-cultural 
differences that prevail in the country of a CEO’s ancestry.  
We show that banks led by CEOs whose cultural heritage emphasizing restraint, group-
mindedness and long-term orientation is safer, more cost-efficient and are associated with more 
cautious acquisitions which, in turn, explains the outperformance. Overall, our work is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the culture of a CEO’s ancestors influences his/her decision-making 
behavior, firm policy choices and performance in the present time.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics for various CEOs and bank variables. Panel A classifies CEOs as Gen1, 
(foreign-born CEOs), Gen2-3, (CEOs who are the children or grandchildren of immigrants to the US) and Gen4+ 
(fourth (or higher) generation of immigrants). Panel B reports the summary statistics for other CEO and bank 
variables. Our sample covers all public US banks for the period of 1994–2006. Definitions of all variables are 
included in Appendix 2.  
Panel A: CEO’s immigrant generation 
 N Shares of total  
Gen1   5 0.8% 
Gen2-3   293 47.6% 
Gen4+   317 51.6% 
Total  615 100.0% 
 
Panel B: CEO and firm characteristics 
Variables N Mean STD p1 p50 p99 
              
Dependent variables: Bank performance and policies     
ROA (%) 3060 1.110 0.681 -0.109 1.096 2.465 
ROE (%) 3060 12.460 6.056 -1.555 12.850 25.520 
Tobin’s Q  2364 1.004 0.004 1.000 1.003 1.016 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (%) 3013 -0.011 0.011 -0.042 -0.010 0.011 
Expenses/Income 3060 0.758 0.085 0.562 0.758 0.987 
       
Competitive measures       
Competitive state 3060 0.561 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
#liberalizations   3020 1.846 1.529 0.000 2.000 4.000 
       
CEO cultural measures       
Harmony 3038 0.399 0.021 0.377 0.386 0.460 
Restraint  3043 0.416 0.163 0.310 0.320 0.800 
Uncertainty Avoidance  3047 0.539 0.171 0.290 0.460 0.950 
Long-term Orientation  3047 0.403 0.222 0.240 0.260 0.830 
Importance of Income Equality 2810 0.444 0.056 0.322 0.428 0.560 
Power Distance  3047 0.429 0.150 0.130 0.400 0.930 
Importance of Self-respect 2810 0.775 0.045 0.676 0.790 0.860 
Masculinity 3047 0.598 0.125 0.100 0.620 0.790 
Humane-orientation  3015 0.553 0.008 0.532 0.551 0.580 
Trust in Others 2810 0.135 0.007 0.119 0.136 0.159 
Individualism 3047 0.801 0.158 0.370 0.910 0.910 
Importance of Selflessness 2810 0.335 0.119 0.069 0.391 0.547 
Importance of Freedom 2810 0.745 0.058 0.585 0.754 0.798 
Performance-orientation 3015 0.427 0.029 0.350 0.445 0.447 
Patriotism  2810 0.352 0.029 0.286 0.368 0.377 
Intellectual Autonomy 3038 0.430 0.013 0.386 0.430 0.453 
       
CEO-specific measures        
Ln (CEO age) 3060 4.035 0.137 3.689 4.043 4.357 
Ln (CEO tenure) 3060 1.916 0.802 0.000 2.001 3.466 
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Panel B: CEO and firm characteristics (cont.) 
Variables N Mean STD p1 p50 p99 
Depression baby 3060 0.036 0.185 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Ivy League 2809 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MBA 2809 0.246 0.431 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Experienced executives 2809 0.208 0.406 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Ln (bonus comp)  831 7.165 1.005 5.740 7.048 9.473 
CEO vega/delta 785 0.301 0.252 0.000 0.253 0.993 
CEO ownership 801 0.020 0.055 0.000 0.003 0.333 
       
Bank-specific measures        
Ln (assets) 3060 14.690 1.801 12.080 14.260 19.870 
Leverage 3060 0.910 0.040 0.820 0.914 0.953 
Lending 3060 0.641 0.134 0.103 0.663 0.869 
Deposit 3060 0.746 0.119 0.280 0.766 0.909 
Stock volatility  3060 0.020 0.009 0.008 0.019 0.048 
HHI 3060 0.380 0.198 0.109 0.326 1.000 
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Table 2: Univariate DiD test: Diagnostics and results  
This table compares the characteristics of treatment banks (operating in a state that removes barriers to single 
branch acquisitions and/or a state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions) and control banks located in states that 
implement no such changes. Panel A shows the mean differences and the p-values in the key characteristics of 
treatment and control banks in the year before changes in interstate branching. Panel B shows the mean differences 
and their p-values in the growth rates of the key characteristics of treatment and control banks one- and two-years 
prior to changes in interstate branching. Definitions of all variables are included in Appendix 2.  
 
 Treatment Control Treatment minus Control 
 Mean Mean Difference p-value 
Panel A: Characteristics of treatment and control banks 
ROA (%) 1.150 1.003 0.148 0.280 
Gen2-3  0.340 0.424 -0.084 0.284 
Ln (assets) 15.014 14.615 0.399 0.207 
Leverage 0.909 0.913 -0.005 0.593 
Lending  0.621 0.629 -0.008 0.679 
Deposit  0.753 0.800 -0.047 0.180 
Stock volatility  0.021 0.022 -0.001 0.584 
HHI  0.329 0.457 -0.128 0.101 
Ln (CEO age) 4.038 4.027 0.011 0.592 
Ln (CEO tenure) 1.869 1.768 0.101 0.445 
     
Panel B: Trends in performance and risk  
ROA1-year (%) 0.079 -0.026 0.105 0.510 
ROA2-year (%) -0.009 0.388 -0.397 0.383 
Leverage1-year (%) 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.535 
Leverage2-year (%) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.456 
Stock volatility1-year (%) -0.071 -0.040 -0.031 0.426 
Stock volatility2-year (%) -0.110 -0.024 -0.086 0.147 
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Table 3: CEO cultural heritage and performance 
The dependent variable is ROA. Gen2-3 is a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is the child or grandchild of 
immigrants to the US. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state at any given time removes 
barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or a state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Columns (1) to (5) 
present OLS results controlling for self-selection bias by including the inverse Mills ratio from a first-stage probit 
regression. Column (6) replicates the model in column (1) after excluding the inverse Mills ratio. Standard errors 
are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Definitions of other variables are 
provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Interaction analyses  
 Heckman 2-stage  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.215*** 0.102** 0.155*** 
 (4.326) (4.333) (3.942) (3.917) (2.289) (4.321) 
Gen2-3  -0.114*** -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.059 -0.061 -0.115*** 
 (-3.933) (-3.528) (-3.691) (-0.376) (-1.405) (-4.206) 
Gen1*Competitive state  0.984** 1.351*** 0.854* 1.117*** 0.596* 0.956*** 
 (2.195) (2.676) (1.910) (6.063) (1.765) (5.376) 
Gen1 -0.157 -0.114 -0.114 -0.707** -0.068 -0.129 
 (-1.423) (-1.067) (-1.027) (-2.087) (-0.368) (-0.631) 
Competitive state -30.835*** -32.762*** -28.639*** -3.031 -12.245 -27.489** 
 (-3.065) (-3.112) (-2.750) (-0.239) (-1.046) (-2.274) 
Ln (assets) 0.536*** 0.492*** 0.546*** 0.231 -0.073 0.535*** 
 (4.722) (4.193) (4.660) (0.825) (-0.410) (4.274) 
Ln (assets)2 -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015* -0.003 -0.015*** 
 (-4.081) (-3.469) (-4.018) (-1.887) (-0.511) (-3.928) 
Leverage -10.399*** -10.456*** -10.503*** -4.740*** -5.943*** -10.998*** 
 (-32.184) (-31.924) (-32.353) (-9.971) (-11.412) (-11.910) 
Lending 0.110 0.128 0.118 -0.293** -0.028 0.135 
 (0.896) (0.978) (0.918) (-2.298) (-0.180) (1.010) 
Deposit -0.304** -0.185 -0.250* 0.214 -0.615*** -0.311* 
 (-2.125) (-1.221) (-1.671) (1.469) (-3.012) (-1.782) 
Stock volatility  -5.959*** -2.457 -3.556** -3.495*** -8.717*** -6.503*** 
 (-3.986) (-1.469) (-2.368) (-3.109) (-6.018) (-2.581) 
HHI -0.164* 0.210 -0.159 -0.442 -0.054 -0.157* 
 (-1.760) (0.247) (-1.330) (-1.138) (-0.648) (-1.778) 
Ln (CEO age) -11.372** -13.390*** -11.410** 2.266 8.461 -5.648 
 (-2.439) (-2.752) (-2.354) (0.262) (1.422) (-1.167) 
Ln (CEO age)2 1.415** 1.661*** 1.418** -0.227 -1.053 0.697 
 (2.428) (2.732) (2.341) (-0.210) (-1.415) (1.156) 
Ln (CEO tenure)  0.137** 0.128** 0.156*** -0.098** 0.007 0.109* 
 (2.419) (2.102) (2.690) (-2.392) (0.122) (1.919) 
Ln (CEO tenure)2  -0.024 -0.022 -0.030* 0.032** 0.010 -0.020 
 (-1.477) (-1.280) (-1.810) (1.989) (0.573) (-1.318) 
Lambda  0.192** 0.302*** 0.247*** -0.089 -0.334** - 
 (2.110) (3.314) (2.683) (-0.313) (-2.287) - 
Year FE Yes No No No No Yes 
State FE Yes No No No No Yes 
State-year trends FE No No Yes No No No 
State-year FE No Yes No No No No 
County-year FE No No No Yes No No 
Firm FE No No No No Yes No 
Observations 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059 
Panel B: H0 = Gen2-3 CEOs*Competitive state + Gen2-3 CEOs = 0  
F-test 3.58* 2.57* 6.22** 7.82** 0.94 2.88* 
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Table 4: Generation-of-immigrant effects 
The dependent variable is ROA. Gen1 indicates CEOs who are born outside the US. Gen2/Gen3/Gen4 indicates 
CEOs who are second-, third- and fourth-generation immigrants. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a 
given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or a state-wide deposit cap on 
branch acquisitions. All models include State-year fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and 
year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-
Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Interaction analysis   
Dependent variable: ROA   
 Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Gen1*Competitive state 1.218**    
 (2.395)    
Gen1 -0.062    
 (-0.592)    
Gen2*Competitive state  0.153***   
  (3.015)   
Gen2  -0.076**   
  (-2.170)   
Gen3*Competitive state   0.113***  
   (2.704)  
Gen3   -0.032  
   (-0.965)  
Gen4*Competitive state    -0.116 
    (-1.445) 
Gen4    0.099 
    (1.366) 
Competitive state -35.699*** -28.375*** -24.285** -27.006** 
 (-3.436) (-2.872) (-2.469) (-2.498) 
Lambda  0.379*** 0.109* 0.148** 0.135** 
 (4.254) (1.688) (2.246) (2.021) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2569 2569 2569 2569 
Panel B: H0 = Generation of immigrant CEOs*Competitive state + Generation of immigrant CEOs = 0 
F-test 5.40** 4.39** 9.95*** 0.24 
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Table 5: The cultural heritage of non-CEO top executives and performance  
This table tests for the cultural heritage effects of non-CEO top executives. We examine three groups of non-CEO top 
executives: 1) the second-highest paid executive, 2) the CFO, and 3) the team of the five highest-paid executives (less the 
CEO). Columns (1)-(3) only control for the cultural heritage of non-CEOs while columns (4)-(6) control for the cultural 
heritage of CEOs and non-CEOs. The dependent variable is ROA. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state 
at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. 
Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Definitions of other 
variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: ROA     
 2nd executive CFO Top Team 2nd executive CFO Top Team 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Gen2-3 2nd executive *Competitive state -0.001   -0.046   
 (-0.008)   (-0.862)   
Gen2-3 2nd executive -0.004   0.014   
 (-0.029)   (0.320)   
Gen2-3 CFO*Competitive state  (-0.100)   -0.050  
  -0.041   (-0.566)  
Gen2-3 CFO  (-0.058)   -0.053  
     (-0.649)  
Gen2-3 Top Team*Competitive state   -0.099   -0.158 
   (-1.083)   (-1.435) 
Gen2-3 Top Team   0.120   0.105 
   (1.634)   (1.121) 
Gen2-3 CEO*Competitive state    0.118** 0.293*** 0.107** 
    (2.010) (3.023) (2.516) 
Gen2-3 CEO    -0.048 -0.332*** -0.054 
    (-0.943) (-3.639) (-1.595) 
Competitive state -38.113 288.096 -70.932*** -19.293 40.990 -45.172** 
 (-0.675) (0.576) (-4.967) (-0.967) (1.462) (-2.389) 
Lambda  -2.090 6.820 -0.084 0.635 -0.111 0.018 
 (-0.711) (0.857) (-0.377) (0.803) (-0.343) (0.588) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2159 854 2615 1619 701 1991 
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Table 6: Individual cultural values and performance 
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression specification: 
ROAitk = α + β1Cultural dimensionit*Competitive statetk + β2Cultural dimensionit + β3Competitive statetk + Controls + State-year FE + εitk 
The dependent variable is ROA. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions 
and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. A total of 16 cultural dimensions are obtained from Hofstede, Schwartz, GLOBE, and WVS. We assign 
the values of each cultural dimension to CEOs according to their ancestral background. Definitions of cultural dimensions and all other variables are provided 
in Appendix 2. We sequentially display the coefficient estimates for regressions on each cultural dimension. For brevity, the table reports the coefficients on the 
interaction term between the cultural dimensions and competitive state (β1) and the coefficients on its constituent variables (β2 and β3). All models include 
State-year fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
  β1  β2  β3 
 Cultural dimension: Obs. coefficient  (p-value)  coefficient  (p-value)  coefficient  (p-value) 
1 Harmony 3,049 2.813*** (3.335)  -2.383 *** (-3.605)  -33.689 *** (-3.213) 
2 Restraint  3,035 0.373*** (3.450)  -0.241 *** (-2.800)  -33.167 *** (-3.089) 
3 Uncertainty Avoidance  3,039 0.357*** (3.470)  -0.225 *** (-2.855)  -34.592 *** (-3.231) 
4 Long-term Orientation  3,039 0.236*** (2.958)  -0.186 *** (-2.929)  -31.283 *** (-2.921) 
5 Importance of Income Equality 2,803 0.486 (1.496)  -0.370 (-1.419)  -27.221 ** (-2.486) 
6 Power Distance    3,040 0.242 (1.317)  -0.067 (-0.471)  -32.138 * (-1.719) 
7 Importance of Self-respect 2,803 -0.299 (-0.704)  0.177 (0.512)  -27.824 ** (-2.568) 
8 Masculinity 3,040 -0.230 (-1.598)  0.039 (0.346)  -34.755 *** (-3.211) 
9 Humane-orientation  3,007 -0.628 (-0.305)  -0.424 (-0.282)  -29.649 *** (-2.805) 
10 Trust in Others 2,803 -1.731 (-0.627)  0.275 (0.139)  -27.895 *** (-2.586) 
11 Individualism 3,039 -0.508*** (-4.487)  0.226 ** (2.556)  -38.051 *** (-3.539) 
12 Importance of Selflessness 2,803 -0.670*** (-4.542)  0.366 *** (3.058)  -28.419 *** (-2.641) 
13 Importance of Freedom 2,803 -1.352*** (-3.949)  1.014 *** (3.533)  -24.400 ** (-2.284) 
14 Performance-orientation 3,007 -2.022*** (-3.198)  1.513 *** (2.951)  -30.066 *** (-2.848) 
15 Patriotism  2,803 -2.093*** (-3.446)  1.487 *** (3.150)  -24.496 ** (-2.273) 
16 Intellectual Autonomy 3,049 -3.556*** (-2.766)  1.062 (1.077)  -31.568 *** (-2.964) 
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Table 7: Factor analysis 
Panel A presents factor loadings on three factors with eigenvalue>1 based on 16 cultural dimensions. Factor 
loadings greater than |0.3| are shown in bold. Panel B links each CEO’s factor scores to bank performance under 
competitive pressure. The dependent variable is ROA. Factor 1, Factor 2, and Factor 3 are the predicted scores 
obtained from factor analysis. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state at any given time 
removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors 
are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Definitions of other variables are 
provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Factor loadings for individual cultural dimensions    
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Eigenvalue  7.023 2.204 1.501 
% explained 0.540 0.170 0.085 
Cumulative % explained 0.540 0.710 0.795 
    
Harmony -0.308 0.140 0.102 
Restraint  -0.340 -0.065 0.008 
Uncertainty Avoidance  -0.325 -0.228 -0.008 
Long-term Orientation  -0.328 0.189 0.083 
Importance of Income Equality -0.052 0.485 0.264 
Power Distance  -0.233 -0.370 -0.222 
Importance of Self-respect 0.210 0.068 -0.154 
Masculinity 0.059 -0.197 0.569 
Humane-orientation  -0.066 0.409 -0.290 
Trust in Others 0.187 0.408 -0.258 
Individualism 0.329 0.032 0.154 
Importance of Selflessness 0.221 -0.231 -0.057 
Importance of Freedom 0.300 -0.059 -0.124 
Performance-orientation 0.313 0.080 0.137 
Patriotism  0.282 -0.269 -0.149 
Intellectual Autonomy 0.089 0.052 0.532 
    
      Panel B: Competitive pressures, factor scores, and performance  
Dependent variable: ROA   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Factor 1*Competitive state -0.025***   -0.026*** 
 (-3.793)   (-3.898) 
Factor 1 0.014***   0.014*** 
 (2.643)   (2.616) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.015  0.016 
  (1.390)  (1.497) 
Factor 2  -0.014  -0.013 
  (-1.642)  (-1.572) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   -0.011 -0.014 
   (-0.904) (-1.157) 
Factor 3   -0.008 -0.007 
   (-0.848) (-0.796) 
Competitive state -29.900*** -25.678** -29.421*** -31.287*** 
 (-2.765) (-2.361) (-2.706) (-2.848) 
Lambda  0.301*** 0.319*** 0.322*** 0.319*** 
 (3.262) (3.448) (3.491) (3.429) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2799 2799 2799 2799 
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Table 8: Factor regressions on bank policies 
This table links a CEO’s cultural factor scores to bank’s policy choices under competitive pressure. The dependent 
variables are acquisition propensity (Panel A), 5-day [2, +2] merger announcement returns (Panel B), annual stock 
return volatility (Panel C), and total expense scaled by total income (Panel D). Factor 1, 2 and 3 are estimated 
using factor analysis (in Table 7). Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state at any given time 
removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors 
are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Definitions of other variables are 
provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Acquisition propensity 
Dependent variable: # acquisitions announced in a given year   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Factor 1*Competitive state 0.008**   0.008* 
 (1.978)   (1.711) 
Factor 1 -0.006*   -0.006 
 (-1.816)   (-1.606) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.006  0.007 
  (1.162)  (1.169) 
Factor 2  -0.016**  -0.016** 
  (-2.213)  (-2.024) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   -0.005 -0.003 
   (-0.636) (-0.321) 
Factor 3   -0.001 0.001 
   (-0.109) (0.112) 
Competitive state -0.358 -3.875 -1.287 -3.207 
 (-0.058) (-0.574) (-0.210) (-0.434) 
Lambda -0.150 -0.252 -0.028 -0.275 
 (-0.513) (-0.827) (-0.102) (-0.714) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2609 2609 2609 2609 
  Panel B: Acquisition performance  
Dependent variable: CARs [-2, +2] %   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Factor 1*Competitive state -0.004**   -0.004** 
 (-1.973)   (-1.976) 
Factor 1 0.003*   0.003 
 (1.697)   (1.578) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.413)  (-0.439) 
Factor 2  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.652)  (-0.501) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   -0.006* -0.005 
   (-1.710) (-1.462) 
Factor 3   0.001 0.001 
   (0.705) (0.278) 
Competitive state -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 
 (-1.623) (-1.330) (-1.169) (-1.331) 
Deal-specific controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations 239 239 239 239 
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Panel C: Bank risk-taking     
Dependent variable: Stock return volatility   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Factor 1*Competitive state 0.036**   0.037** 
 (2.079)   (2.111) 
Factor 1 -0.014   -0.014 
 (-1.000)   (-1.018) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.019  0.021 
  (0.877)  (0.959) 
Factor 2  -0.015  -0.016 
  (-0.810)  (-0.868) 
Factor 3*Competitive state  45.858 -0.004 -0.003 
  (1.356) (-0.149) (-0.107) 
Factor 3   0.013 0.014 
   (0.542) (0.609) 
Competitive state 50.105 45.858 45.359 54.279 
 (1.501) (1.356) (1.360) (1.639) 
Lambda  0.006   0.006  0.006   0.007 
 (0.016)     (0.016)     (0.016)     (0.016)     
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2756 2756 2756 2756 
Panel D: Cost-efficiency   
Dependent variable: Expense/ Income   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Factor 1*Competitive state 0.006***   0.006*** 
 (3.369)   (3.569) 
Factor 1 -0.001   -0.001 
 (-0.686)   (-0.682) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.004  0.004 
  (1.286)  (1.426) 
Factor 2  0.001  0.001 
  (0.291)  (0.285) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   0.003 0.003 
   (0.985) (1.026) 
Factor 3   -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.055) (-0.061) 
Competitive state 3.617 2.491 2.252 4.553 
 (0.940) (0.653) (0.590) (1.160) 
Lambda  0.106*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (2.999) (2.933) (2.964) (2.982) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2799 2799 2799 2799 
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Appendix 1: Interstate banking deregulation  
This table shows the regulatory changes in the banking industry over the period 1994–2006. Each column represents 
the roadblocks that a state adopts against the IBBEA provisions. Data source: Rice and Strahan (2010).  
State Effective date Single branch 
acquisition 
restriction 
State-wide 
deposit cap on 
branch 
acquisition 
Age 
restriction 
De novo 
interstate 
branching 
restriction 
Alabama  05/31/1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Alaska 01/01/1994 No 50% 3 Yes 
Arizona 08/31/2001 No 30% 5 Yes 
Arizona 09/01/1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Arkansas  06/01/1997 Yes 25% 5 Yes 
California 09/28/1995 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Colorado  06/01/1997 Yes 25% 5 Yes 
Connecticut  06/27/1995 No 30% 5 No 
Delaware  09/29/1995 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Washington DC  06/13/1996 No 30% No No 
Florida  06/01/1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
Georgia 05/10/1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
Georgia 06/01/1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Hawaii 01/01/2001 No 30% No No 
Hawaii 06/01/1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Idaho 09/29/1995 Yes No 5 Yes 
Illinois  08/20/2004 No 30% No No 
Illinois  06/01/1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Indiana  07/01/1998 No 30% 5 No 
Indiana  06/01/1997 No 30% No No 
Iowa 04/04/1996 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Kansas 09/29/1995 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Kentucky  03/22/2004 Yes 15% No Yes 
Kentucky  03/17/2000 Yes 15% No Yes 
Kentucky  06/01/1997 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Louisiana  06/01/1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Maine 01/01/1997 No 30% No No 
Maryland  09/29/1995 No 30% No No 
Massachusetts 08/02/1996 No 30% 3 No 
Michigan 11/29/1995 No No No No 
Minnesota 06/01/1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Mississippi 06/01/1997 Yes 25% 5 Yes 
Missouri 09/29/1995 Yes 13% 5 Yes 
Montana 10/01/2001 Yes 22% 5 Yes 
Montana 09/29/1995 N/A +1% per year 
from 18% to 
22% 
4 N/A 
Nebraska 05/31/1997 Yes 14% 5 Yes 
Nevada 09/29/1995 Limited 30% 5 Limited 
New Hampshire  01/01/2002 No 30% No No 
New Hampshire  08/01/2000 No 30% 5 No 
New Hampshire  06/01/1997 Yes 20% 5 Yes 
New Jersey 04/17/1996 No 30% No Yes 
New Mexico 06/01/1996 Yes 40% 5 Yes 
New York  06/01/1997 No 30% 5 Yes 
North Carolina  07/01/1995 No 30% No No 
North Dakota 08/01/2003 No 25% No No 
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North Dakota 05/31/1997 Yes 25% No Yes 
Ohio 05/21/1997 No 30% No No 
Oklahoma 05/17/2000 No 20% No No 
Oklahoma 05/31/1997 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Oregon 07/01/1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
Pennsylvania 07/06/1995 No 30% No No 
Rhode Island  06/20/1995 No 30% No No 
South Carolina  07/01/1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
South Dakota 03/09/1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Tennessee 03/17/2003 No 30% 3 No 
Tennessee 07/01/2001 No 30% 5 No 
Tennessee 05/01/1998 No 30% 5 Yes 
Tennessee 06/01/1997 Yes 20% 5 Yes 
Texas 09/01/1999 No 20% No No 
Texas 08/28/1995 N/A 20% N/A N/A 
Utah  04/30/2001 No 30% 5 No 
Utah  06/01/1995 No 30% 5 Yes 
Vermont  01/01/2001 No 30% No No 
Vermont  05/30/1996 No 30% 5 Yes 
Virginia 09/29/1995 No 30% No No 
Washington  05/09/2005 No 30% 5 No 
Washington  06/06/1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
West Virginia  05/31/1997 No 25% No No 
Wisconsin 05/01/1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Wyoming  05/31/1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
CEO’s cultural heritage measures   
Gen2-3 Equals 1 if the CEO is a child or grandchild of immigrants  ancestry.com 
Gen4+ Equals 1 if the CEO is a fourth or higher generation of immigrants ancestry.com 
Gen1 Equals 1 if the CEO is a foreign immigrant ancestry.com 
Gen2 Equals 1 if the CEO is a child of foreign immigrants ancestry.com 
Gen3 Equals 1 if the CEO is a grandchild of foreign immigrants ancestry.com 
Gen4 Equals 1 if the CEO is a great-grandchild of foreign immigrants ancestry.com 
Harmony Related to the freedom to pursue own thoughts   Schwartz 
Restraint  Related to the ability to control desires    Hofstede 
Uncertainty Avoidance  Related to the level of stress in the face of an unknown future  Hofstede 
Long-term Orientation  Related to the choice of focus for people effort   Hofstede 
Importance of Income Equality Related to the importance of income equality    WVS 
Power Distance Related to the basic problem of human inequality Hofstede  
Importance of Self-respect Related to the importance of self-respect   WVS 
Masculinity  Related to the division of emotional between gender   Hofstede 
Humane-orientation  Related to the extent to which altruism and generosity is rewarded   GLOBE 
Trust in Others Related to the willingness to trust in others   WVS 
Individualism  Related to the integration of individuals into group  Hofstede 
Importance of Selflessness Related to the importance of selflessness    WVS 
Importance of Freedom Related to the importance of freedom   WVS 
Performance-orientation Related to the extent to which performance is rewarded   GLOBE 
Patriotism Related to the importance of patriotism WVS 
Intellectual Autonomy Related to the discomfort with confrontation and assertiveness  Schwartz  
  
Bank competition measures   
Competitive state  Dummy equals 1 if a given state at any given time removes barriers 
to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch 
acquisition 
Rice and 
Strahan 
(2010) 
#liberalizations Number ranges from 0 (highly regulated) to 4 (deregulated) based 
on regulation changes in a given state 
Before2+ All years up to and including two years before the deregulation  
Before1 One year prior to deregulation 
Present The year of deregulation 
After1 One year post-deregulation 
After2+ Two years after the deregulation 
   
Bank outcomes 
ROA (%) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of 
total assets (BHCK2170) 
CRSP, 
FR Y9-C 
ROE (%) EBIT divided by book value of total equity (BHCK3210) CRSP, 
FR Y9-C 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity divided by book value of total equity 
(BHCK3210) 
CRSP 
Stock volatility Standard deviation of a firm’s stock return in a given year CRSP 
Expense/Income Total expenses (BHCK4073+ BHCK4093) divided by total income 
(BHCK 4107+BHCK4079) 
FR Y9-C 
Marginal Expected Shortfall The average return for each bank on days when the returns of the 
overall financial markets are in bottom 5% in a given year 
CRSP 
 
Other CEO characteristics  
Ln (CEO age) Natural logarithm of the CEO age BoardEx 
Ln (CEO tenure) Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has served in 
this position 
BoardEx 
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Ivy League Equals 1 if the CEO has an Ivy League education  BoardEx 
MBA Equals 1 if the CEO has an MBA degree  BoardEx 
Experienced executives Equals 1 if the CEO with previous executive appointments   BoardEx 
Depression baby Equals 1 if the CEO was born between 1920 and 1929 BoardEx 
Ln (bonus comp)  Natural logarithm of the CEO bonus compensation ExecuComp 
CEO ownership The fraction of shares owned by the CEO  ExecuComp 
CEO vega Sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return volatility, 
expressed in $'1000 
ExecuComp 
CEO delta Sensitivity of CEO compensation to share price, expressed in 
$'1000 
ExecuComp 
   
Other bank characteristics  
Ln (assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170) FR Y-9C 
Leverage Book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets FR Y-9C 
Lending Ratio of total loans (BHCK2122) divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
Deposits Ratio of total deposits (BHDM6631+BHFN6631 + BHDM6636 + 
BHFN6636) divided by total assets 
FR Y-9C 
HHI Index measuring the concentration of deposits at the state level FR Y-9C 
Foreign loans Total foreign loans divided by total assets  FR Y-9C 
Foreign deposits  Total foreign deposits divided by total assets  FR Y-9C 
   
County-level characteristics   
Ln (population) Natural logarithm of the county population  US Census 
Bureau 
Civilian labor force Fraction of the population who have jobs or are seeking jobs, are at 
least 16 years old, are not serving in the military and are not 
institutionalized 
US Census 
Bureau 
Ln (personal income) Natural logarithm of the individual’s income from wages, 
investment enterprises and other ventures 
US Census 
Bureau 
Religiosity  The number of religious adherents divided by the total population. 
Data available for 1990, 2000, 2010 and are interpolated for the 
remaining years.   
Association of 
Religion Data 
Archive 
 
Characteristics at origin in 1900 
Ln (GDP) at origin  Natural logarithm of GDP in the ancestral country of origin of the 
CEO 
UN Statistics 
Division 
Ln (life expectancy) at origin Natural logarithm of life expectancy in the ancestral country of 
origin of the CEO 
UN Statistics 
Division 
Legal system at origin Equals 1 if the CEO ancestral country of origin has a French Civil 
with German Civil law influence, 2 if German Civil law, 3 if 
Common law, 4 if Nordic law, 5 if mixed between Napoleonic law 
and German law  
UN Statistics 
Division 
   
Corporate governance measures   
Board size The number of directors sitting on the board BoardEx 
Board independence The fraction of non-executive directors on the board BoardEx 
   
   
51 
Appendix 3: Probit estimates on data being available on a CEO’s ancestors (first-stage Heckman results)  
This table estimates the likelihood that we are able to identify a CEO’s country of origin from ancestry.com. This 
analysis is estimated over a full sample of 5,636 bank-year observations from 1996 to 2004. The dependent variable 
equals 1 when we can retrieve data on the CEO’s ancestor. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given 
state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch 
acquisition. CEO’s surname length is the length of a CEO’s surname. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm 
and year. Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2.  t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Dependent variable: Equals 1 if data on the CEO’s ancestor is available  
  (1) (2) 
      
Ln (assets) 0.116*** 0.113*** 
 (3.014) (2.605) 
Ln (assets)2 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.559) (-1.241) 
Competitive state  -0.049** 0.486*** 
 (-2.042) (14.656) 
Leverage 0.041 0.067 
 (0.283) (0.482) 
Lending -0.102** -0.070 
 (-2.233) (-1.372) 
Deposit 0.318*** 0.332*** 
 (4.899) (4.581) 
HHI 0.059 1.349*** 
 (1.416) (53.368) 
Stock volatility  0.389 0.534 
 (0.632) (0.699) 
Ln (CEO age) -12.994*** -12.866*** 
 (-8.257) (-7.277) 
Ln (CEO age)2 1.635*** 1.619*** 
 (8.402) (7.406) 
Ln (CEO tenure)  0.079*** 0.111*** 
 (3.150) (3.816) 
Ln (CEO tenure)2  -0.010 -0.016** 
 (-1.353) (-2.022) 
CEO’s surname length  0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (9.220) (8.039) 
Year FE Yes No 
State FE Yes No 
State-year FE No Yes 
Observations 5649 5649 
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Appendix 4: Does endogenous CEO-firm matching drive our results?  
This table reports various tests to address concerns about endogenous CEO-firm matching. Panel A tests whether 
our results are driven by CEOs who have been appointed closer to deregulation. Column (1) includes firm-year 
observations where the CEO assumes office at least three years before a state opens for deregulation. Column (2) 
includes firm-year observations where the CEO assumes office within three years of deregulation. Panel B evaluates 
bank performance around exogenous CEO turnover events (arising from CEO death, illness or long-planned 
retirements). Column (1) reports a bank fixed effects panel regressions on ROA and Column (2) reports difference 
regressions on performance differences (ΔROA, in percentages). Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a 
given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch 
acquisitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. 
Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Are our results driven by CEOs appointed closer to deregulation?  
 Tenure before deregulation >= 3 Tenure before deregulation < 3 
  (1) (2) 
      
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.264*** 0.204*** 
 (5.155) (3.758) 
Gen2-3 -0.158*** -0.122*** 
 (-4.153) (-2.658) 
Competitive state 16.890 -30.593* 
 (1.029) (-1.731) 
Lambda  -0.059 0.452*** 
 (-0.595) (4.319) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,503 1,503 
Panel B: Exogenous CEO turnovers   
 ROA ROA 
  (1) (2) 
      
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.282** 1.093*** 
 (2.426) (2.668) 
Gen2-3 -0.224** -1.271*** 
 (-2.207) (-3.582) 
Competitive state -11.414 -47.839 
 (-0.376) (-0.428) 
Lambda  -0.231 -1.275 
 (-1.008) (-1.554) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 523 520 
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Appendix 5: Controlling for additional county characteristics  
This table reports estimation results that control for additional county-level controls: Ln (population), the natural 
logarithm of the county population; Civilian labor force, the fraction of the population who have jobs or are 
seeking jobs, are at least 16 years old, are not serving in the military and are not institutionalized; Ln (personal 
income), the natural logarithm of the individual’s income from wages, investment enterprises and other ventures; 
and Religiosity, the number of religious adherents divided by the total population. Data on religiosity are available 
for 1990, 2000, 2010 and are interpolated for the remaining years. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a 
given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch 
acquisition.  Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. 
Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: ROA   
 (1) (2) 
   
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.147*** 0.161*** 
 (3.864) (4.226) 
Gen2-3 -0.093*** -0.105*** 
 (-3.104) (-3.519) 
Ln (population)*Competitive state -0.117 -0.134* 
 (-1.524) (-1.739) 
Ln (population) 0.159** 0.175** 
 (2.089) (2.290) 
Civilian labor force*Competitive state 0.530 0.635 
 (1.092) (1.302) 
Civilian labor force -0.099 -0.137 
 (-0.255) (-0.352) 
Ln (personal income)*Competitive state 0.018 0.025 
 (1.058) (1.439) 
Ln (personal income) -0.029** -0.031** 
 (-2.203) (-2.309) 
Religiosity*Competitive state 1.580 0.510*** 
 (0.973) (2.782) 
Religiosity  -0.309* 
  (-1.916) 
Competitive state 1.580 1.546 
 (0.973) (0.942) 
Lambda 0.313*** 0.346*** 
 (3.410) (3.714) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes 
Observations     2983 2946  
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Appendix 6: Controlling for additional CEO characteristics  
This table reports estimation results that control for additional CEO characteristics. Column (1) controls for 
observable CEO characteristics: Ivy League indicates CEOs who graduated from an Ivy League institution; MBA 
indicates CEOs with an MBA degree; Experienced executives indicates CEOs with prior experience as a top 
executive; and Depression baby indicates CEO born between 1920 and 1929. Columns (2) controls for CEO pay 
incentives: ln(bonus comp), the natural logarithm of the CEO bonus compensation; CEO ownership, the fraction of 
shares owned by the CEO; CEO vega/ CEO delta, CEO’s risk-taking incentives relative to pay-performance 
sensitivity. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single 
branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by 
firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. All models include State-year fixed effects. Definitions of 
other variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) 
      
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.126*** 0.135* 
 (3.296) (1.954) 
Gen2-3 -0.107*** -0.072 
 (-3.458) (-1.393) 
Ivy League*Competitive state -0.069  
 (-1.303)  
Ivy League 0.102**  
 (2.487)  
MBA*Competitive state 0.170***  
 (3.833)  
MBA  -0.102***  
 (-2.817)  
Experienced executives*Competitive state -0.054  
 (-1.251)  
Experienced executives -0.117***  
 (-3.598)  
Depression baby*Competitive state -0.027  
 (-0.231)  
Depression baby -0.119  
 (-1.293)  
Ln (bonus comp)*Competitive state  -0.314*** 
  (-5.534) 
Ln (bonus comp)  0.478*** 
  (10.445) 
CEO ownership*Competitive state  -0.808*** 
  (-4.765) 
CEO ownership  0.270** 
  (1.986) 
CEO vega/delta*Competitive state  -0.456 
  (-0.586) 
CEO vega/delta  -0.014 
  (-0.021) 
Competitive state 1.209 -9.798** 
 (0.828) (-2.438) 
Lambda  0.277*** 0.082 
 (3.413) (0.700) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2808 784 
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Appendix 7: Economic development and institutional quality in the CEO’s country of origin  
This table reports estimation results that control for the economic development and quality of institutions of the 
CEO’s ancestral country of origin, measured in 1900 terms. Ln (GDP) at origin is the natural logarithm of GDP in 
the ancestral country of origin of the CEO; Ln (life expectancy) at origin is the natural logarithm of life expectancy 
in the ancestral country of origin of the CEO; Legal system at origin is equals 1 if the CEO ancestral country of 
origin has a French Civil with German Civil law influence, 2 if German Civil law, 3 if Common law, 4 if Nordic 
law, 5 if mixed between Napoleonic law and German law. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given 
state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitiosn and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch 
acquisitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. 
Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: ROA  
 (1) 
    
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.121** 
 (2.444) 
Gen2-3 -0.086** 
 (-2.223) 
Ln (GDP) at origin*Competitive state -0.003 
 (-0.024) 
Ln (GDP) at origin 0.109 
 (1.219) 
Ln (life expectancy) at origin*Competitive state -0.390 
 (-1.410) 
Ln (life expectancy) at origin -0.122 
 (-0.567) 
Legal system at origin*Competitive state 0.045* 
 (1.802) 
Legal system at origin -0.008 
 (-0.431) 
Competitive state 1.310 
 (0.816) 
Lambda  0.160* 
 (1.739) 
Gen1 controls Yes 
Other controls  Yes 
State-year FE Yes 
Observations 2888 
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Appendix 8: The dynamics of bank profitability during deregulation  
This table provides additional evidence on the validity of our shock. Panel A tests the dynamics of bank profitability 
during deregulation by replacing the competitive state dummy with a set of dummies around the year in which the 
state removes barriers to interstate branching. Panel B displays a placebo test where we inaccurately assign states 
into two competitive categories. All models include State-year fixed effects. Competitive state is a dummy that 
equals 1 if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap 
on branch acquisition.  Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–
2006. Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Dynamics of bank profitability 
Dependent variable: ROA 
  (1) (2) 
Before2+*Gen2-3 0.031 0.062 
 (0.455) (0.857) 
Before1*Gen2-3 -0.001 0.084 
 (-0.009) (0.809) 
Present*Gen2-3 0.135 0.173* 
 (1.502) (1.780) 
After1*Gen2-3 0.140* 0.127 
 (1.762) (1.527) 
After2+*Gen2-3 0.192*** 0.200*** 
 (4.383) (4.667) 
Gen2-3 -0.135*** 0.062 
 (-3.868) (0.857) 
Before2+  0.247 -0.137*** 
 (1.006) (-4.011) 
Before1 0.304 0.038 
 (1.229) (0.123) 
Present 0.127 0.075 
 (0.471) (0.242) 
After1 0.071 0.745 
 (0.265) (0.550) 
After2+ -0.017 0.789 
 (-0.063) (0.580) 
Lambda 0.161* 0.275*** 
 (1.754) (3.013) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No 
State FE Yes No 
State-year FE No Yes 
Observations 3065 3065 
Panel B: Placebo checks   
Dependent variable: ROA   
 (1) 
Gen2-3*Competitive state  0.041 
 (1.137) 
Gen2-3 -0.038 
 (-1.573) 
Competitive state 18.349* 
 (1.696) 
Gen1 controls Yes 
Other controls  Yes 
State-year FE Yes 
Observations 3018 
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Appendix 9: Alternative regression specifications: performance, industry competition, empirical model  
This table reports alternative regression specifications. Columns (1), (2), (3) use alternative performance measures 
as dependent variables: ROE (%), Tobin’s Q and MES. Columns (4) and (5) test whether our results are driven by 
the data collection process, Column (4) includes observations where the CEO is born before 1940 while column (5) 
includes observations where the CEO is born after 1940. Column (6) uses an alternative measure of industry 
competition: #relaxations, the number of relaxations (as opposed to barriers) the state adopts towards interstate 
branching. Column (7) only considers banks operating in competitive states where banks with Gen2-3 CEOs are 
assigned to the treatment group and those with Gen4+ are assigned to the control group. Column (8) includes two 
additional board characteristics: board size, the total number of directors on the board; and board independence, 
the fraction of non-executive directors on the board. Columns (9) controls for ROA in 1994, which is the 
performance of the bank at the beginning of the sample period. Column (10) controls for foreign loans, which is 
total foreign loans divided by total assets; and foreign deposits, which is total foreign deposits divided by total 
assets. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 1 if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single 
branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisition. Standard errors are double-clustered by 
firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Definitions of other variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.   
 ROE (%) Tobin’s Q MES  CEO birth 
year <=1940 
CEO birth 
year >1940 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
         
Gen2-3*Competitive state 2.203*** 0.498*** -0.127* 0.280*** 0.200*** 
 (4.712) (4.609) (-1.893) (3.748) (4.372) 
Gen2-3 -1.644*** -0.347*** 0.030 0.172 -0.130*** 
 (-4.461) (-3.883) (0.560) (0.829) (-3.456) 
Competitive state -14.047 -16.363*** 7.830*** -0.363 -2.299 
 (-0.805) (-3.807) (3.155) (-0.102) (-1.284) 
Lambda  1.383 1.114*** 0.576*** -0.152 0.388*** 
 (1.256) (2.788) (3.242) (-0.894) (4.228) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3059 2363 3012 828 2231 
 
 All 
relaxations 
Within-state
only 
Add board 
controls 
ROA in 
1994 
Add foreign 
controls 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.041*** 0.180*** 0.213*** 0.164*** 0.148*** 
 (-3.337) (2.627) (4.784) (4.343) (4.296) 
Gen2-3 -0.055** -0.112* -0.132*** -0.063** -0.095*** 
 (1.995) (-1.766) (-3.565) (-2.055) (-3.514) 
Competitive state 0.072 -18.053 0.892 -20.465** 0.016 
 (0.183) (-0.732) (0.533) (-2.098) (0.011) 
Lambda  0.281*** 0.598*** 0.224** 0.047 0.155* 
 (3.078) (3.711) (2.280) (0.591) (1.901) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3066 2012 2409 2374 3025 
 
